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I
It is a commonplace that the formal study of hermeneutics or exegesis 
began by centering on texts. In his profoundly rich and comprehensive Truth 
and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer states (1985:146): “The classical discipline 
concerned with the art of understanding texts is hermeneutics.” He goes on 
immediately to explain how the concept of hermeneutics must be extended to 
include aesthetics, “the whole sphere of art and its complex of questions.” He 
notes later (353) that hermeneutics extends also to oral utterance and states 
that Schleiermacher was the fi rst to discern this truth. But aesthetics and oral 
utterance appear as “extensions” of a narrower original focus, the textual 
focus. Gadamer recalls (353) “that the task of hermeneutics was originally 
and chiefl y the understanding of texts.” This appears to have applied quite 
certainly to the rabbinical tradition, too, from the start, even in the light of the 
interplay of text and orality in this tradition described by Susan A. Handelman 
in The Slayers of Moses (1982:27-82).
The formal study of hermeneutics or interpretation or exegesis that 
began by focusing on texts and then extended itself to provide interpretations 
of art and/or oral utterance extended eventually—although Gadamer does not 
go into such matters—also to gesture or other kinesics (the use of any kind of 
nonlinguistic body movements), to social behavior, to social structures, and 
eventually to anything that carries “meaning,” intentionally or merely de facto. 
One can even interpret a sunset or a blast of wind, for interpretation (the Latin-
based equivalent of the Greek-based “hermeneutics”) means ultimately making 
evident to a present audience or milieu something in a manifestation that is not 
of itself evident to this milieu (it may be quite evident to other milieus).
Even when the concept of hermeneutics or interpretation is extended 
far beyond the textual, however, there can remain a tendency to take textual 
interpretation as the model for all other kinds of interpretation. In “The Model 
of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text,” Paul Ricoeur proposes 
that the human sciences (sciences humaines, such as history,
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sociology, and so forth) develop by interpreting human action by analogy 
with textual interpretation (1971:529), which serves not only as the historical 
starting point for the science of hermeneutics or interpretation but as a model 
or paradigm for all interpretation (559). Human actions, in other words, are 
understood for interpretive purposes by analogy with texts, though, of course, 
they are not reduced to texts. The idea of “nature” as something “out there” 
like a text of a book–a kind of visible “thing” to be read and interpreted runs 
back at least to the Middle Ages (Curtius 1953:311-19). But David Olson (ms. 
in progress) has made a more specifi c point: the very idea of interpretation as 
an activity separate from other kinds of statement depends on the existence of 
writing. Interpretation of the “text” that is the world would be something of a 
different order than the text itself if the world is like a text. Before writing, there is 
no functional or effective distinction between a statement and an interpretation 
of a statement. Asked to repeat a statement and an interpretation of a statement 
that he or she has made, a person from an oral culture commonly gives not a 
word-for-word repetition of what he or she has said, but an interpretation–and 
with good reason, I would suggest, since the request to repeat the statement 
establishes a new context for the statement (one which, moreover, suggests 
that the original wording was not understood). Since the oral mind is holistic, it 
adapts to the new context with a wording that presumably fi ts the new context, 
not the original context, a wording which we would regard as interpretative 
but which to the oral mind represents in the new context essentially what the 
original statement represented in the original context. What is the point of 
repeating verbatim a statement that is unclear enough to elicit a request to 
repeat it? A text sets up a different situation from this oral scenario, providing a 
visual object which is thing-like, seemingly stable, so that verbal commentary 
on it appears to be of a different order of being. In Olson’s view, it would seem, 
interpretation is antecedent to text, for it operates in purely oral cultures, too: 
texts provide verbalization which only appears different from interpretation.
Olson’s and Ricoeur’s observations are extraordinarily informative, 
and they both suggest a somewhat text-centered concept of interpretation or 
hermeneutics which the history of the term, as explained by Gadamer, validates. 
Hermeneutics begins with texts, and it appears to stay in some primary sense 
with texts or, if in some vaguer sense not always with texts, at least with words, 
implying that the problem of explanation or hermeneutics is paradigmatically 
a problem of making clear something that is verbalized.
Why is this so? Since anything that is unclear may call for 
interpretation—a sunset, as instanced before, or a person’s gait or other 
behavior–why is the formal study of hermeneutics or interpretation so primarily 
focused on something that is verbalized or, more specifi cally, something that 
is textualized (written or printed)? First, because of all things in human life, 
words clamor most for explanation. The reason they do is
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paradoxical: words themselves are efforts at explanation, and, in so far as they 
do not provide total explanation, they face the reader or hearer with unfi nished 
business. Total verbal explicitness is impossible, so that all words, written or 
spoken, are invitations for more words. But textualized words, written or printed, 
call especially for explanation because, while spoken words–which for tens of 
thousands of years were the only words formed in any human society–are in 
great part ultimately explained, given meaning (implicitly but really), by the 
nonverbal elements in the situation in which they are spoken–who is speaking 
to whom, on what occasion, with what sort of force, with what gestures, what 
facial expressions, and so on–these nonverbal elements are missing in a text and 
must somehow be made up for. Hermeneutics (interpretation, exegesis) allows 
us to make up for them, shows how to supply now in words the originally 
nonverbal elements or their equivalents. (Of course, the supplied, interpretive 
words themselves are ultimately explicable only with the help of the nonverbal, 
but for the nonce they suffi ce.) Even if we know the language in a text, to 
interpret a text two thousand years old requires special knowledge and skills 
to recover something of the text’s extraverbal context, in which its meaning 
was originally defi ned, and thus requires formal study and/or application of 
hermeneutical or interpretative or exegetical techniques.
Moreover, formal, “scientifi c” study of anything at all is by its nature 
text-dependent and in this sense text-oriented: formal study requires texts, 
written or printed (Ong 1982:8-10). This is not to say that persons from a 
primary oral culture, a culture with no idea at all of writing, cannot be widely 
knowledgeable and articulate about specifi c matters as well as wise about 
complex and deep matters, but only that they cannot set up their knowledge 
in the elaborately categorical, scientifi c ways that formal study demands 
and that writing and, even more, print and computer cultures can manage. 
Since formal study of any subject began with the use of texts, its interest in 
interpretation gravitates with a special intensity toward texts fi rst of all: these 
constitute the habitat of its thinking in a way that pure orality does not. It took 
many millennia for a science of linguistics to develop which had a true feel for 
language as basically oral, as sound. Rhetoric indeed had for centuries studied 
the use of language, and precisely the use of sounded language, for rhetoric 
was originally, and until very recent years, the study of oratory, but rhetoric 
was not linguistics or even much related to linguistics: it was more related to 
politics, developing skills addressed to practical persuasive purposes.
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II
One reason, then, why hermeneutics has begun with texts is that 
they are at fi rst blush more noetically manageable than oral utterance is (Ong 
1982:1-30), for they are quiescent, passive, fi xed, recuperable, manipulable. 
They are seemingly reifi ed verbalization. They can be treated as things. But 
several developments in structuralism and poststructuralism and deconstruction 
have tended to undermine this sense of the text as simply reifi ed. Awareness of 
intertextuality makes it evident that all texts, even when they are not explicitly 
citing other texts, are interwoven with other texts in the most elusive ways. 
All texts are part of what poststructuralists call generically Text or Writing or 
Ecriture (Barthes), which often renders any given bit of writing particularly 
unsteady in the virtually limitless and uncontrollable relations it has with an 
unknown number of other writings. Thus we fi nd Michel Leiris’s “refl ections 
on the associations of the name ‘Persephone’ alongside Derrida’s discussion 
of the limits of philosophy” or, perhaps at the greatest extreme, Derrida’s Glas, 
which presents in parallel the text of Hegel’s analysis of the concept of the 
family and a text of Jean Genet, interrelating the two (see Culler 1982:136). 
Intertextualist critics look for the most unexpected “traces” of other texts in 
a given text, “a set of relations with other texts” (Leitch 1983:59) cued in by 
various methods. Of course, there is no end to this game. One can always 
produce one more study, or a hundred more studies, carrying into new innings, 
if not always new thoughts.
Intertextuality has upset many persons by countering the more or 
less received romantic doctrine that the successful writer was marked by 
“originality,” an ability to produce quite fresh verbiage, something new and 
previously unrealized. This most often unarticulated but strong presumption 
has produced the state of mind which Harold Bloom treats in The Anxiety of 
Infl uence (1973)–the nervous fear that, after all, one may be inevitably more 
bound to one’s textual predecessors than it is comfortable to admit.
Further, ideals of literature as “self-expression” have encouraged the 
older anti-intertextualist set of mind, for what can be more different from 
everything else in existence than I myself am? As Gerard Manley Hopkins 
notes (1959:123), “We say that any two things however unlike are in something 
alike. This is the one exception: when I compare myself, my being-myself, 
with anything else whatsoever, all things alike, all in the same degree, rebuff 
me with blank unlikeness.” The “taste of self” is absolutely unique. In 1890, 
the year after Hopkins’ death, William James makes precisely the same point 
(1950:289): “to everyone, the neighbor’s me falls together with all the rest of 
things in one foreign mass against which his own me stands out in startling 
relief.” Although everyone is aware that
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everyone’s verbal expression is somewhat derivative, to think of writing 
as essentially self-expression is in some ways to encourage the most anti-
intertextualist mindset possible.
In Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology (1971) I have tried to make 
the point that the Romantic Movement coincided with the deep interiorization 
of print, which culminated (for the moment–the computer was yet to come) 
the reduction of sound to space initiated by script. This interiorization of 
print coincided with a marked atrophy of the old classical rhetorical tradition 
which had dominated the academic and intellectual world since antiquity 
in sometimes gross and sometimes subtle but always pervasive ways. The 
classical rhetorical tradition had kept the old oral tradition of expression very 
much alive even through many centuries of manuscript culture and for the fi rst 
three centuries and more after print, for rhetoric was originally the art of public 
speaking and its oral pull was strong until the fuller fi xation of the spoken 
word in space which print eventually effected. The fi rst American rhetoric to 
address itself explicitly to written composition, Samuel Newman’s A Practical 
System of Rhetoric, appeared only in 1827 (Stewart 1983:145). And the point 
has often been made that McGuffey’s Readers, the fi rst of which was published 
in 1836, were concerned not principally with reading for understanding but 
with declamatory platform reading. Many new developments in literary and 
intellectual genres following on the deep interiorization of print with the 
Romantic Age and immediately after were antithetical to the old classical 
rhetoric: the encouragement of silent reading, the weakening or virtual 
disappearance of orally grounded noetic structures (formulaic expression and 
composition, including the conspicuous use of balance, parallelism, antithesis, 
epithets, openly agonistic approaches to subjects generally, and the like). These 
elements, evident well into our present century, but more and more moribund, 
caught in the backwaters of thought, were more and more submerged as print–
and, eventually, the computer–brought attention to bear more and more on the 
text as text. Ultimately, as vernacular literature by the end of the 1800s became 
a signifi cant academic subject, the ground was laid for the New Criticism, 
or, its continental European equivalent, Formalism, each a self-consciously 
text-bound approach to verbal interpretation, keeping the reader’s attention 
programmatically close to what was before him or her on the page, reifying the 
text as it had never been reifi ed before.
Then, after the New Criticism and Formalism had served their 
usefulness, there came structuralism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction, 
and with these, the sense or cause of intertextuality, which noted how massively, 
and often subtly, a text was really not so quiescently reifi ed as its visual make-
up suggested but was, to any reader, dependent upon other texts.
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III
Of course, recognition of the “infl uence” of one text on another was 
not new. What was new about the modern sense of intertextuality was the 
sense of how thoroughly and hauntingly and inevitably texts seem to inhabit 
one another, how much echoing and counterechoing there not only was but 
also had to be. Textualization builds all texts into each other. There are “traces” 
of everything everywhere, and to the extent that the traces even at some points 
(not at all points, I would insist) contradict one another (if given the necessary 
interpretation), they thereby give rise to deconstruction, the critical enterprise 
which undertakes to show always that any given work of textual art eventually 
breaks itself down, implying in one place what it denies elsewhere.
The destabilization of the text effected by deconstruction was abetted 
by the reader-oriented or reader-response criticism which grew into prominence 
a little ahead of deconstruction, and which insisted that one could not assign a 
meaning to a text simply in terms of the intent of its writer. One must also take 
into account what the reader makes of the text, the reader’s response, for in the 
reader, and only in the reader, the text comes to life.
IV
Both the sense of intertextuality and reader-response theory have had 
a twofold effect. On the one hand, they have called attention to the text more 
than ever before. But on the other hand, they have destabilized the text, making 
it impossible to regard it as simply an isolated, visual unit, quiescent, passive, 
fi xed, recuperable, manipulable–in other words, manageable as an object is. 
Intertextuality involves the text in front of one’s eyes with so many other 
possible texts as to make the text in front of one’s eyes impossible to pin down 
completely. Reader-response criticism involves the text with the nontextual 
quite explicitly: it locates the text within the consciousness of whatever reader 
chances upon it. Putting utterance into writing or print can easily be thought 
of as removing it from discourse. This is precisely what putting utterance into 
writing or print cannot do. There is no way to remove utterance from discourse. 
Writing and/or print only delays the discourse, which the reader resumes.
One of the paradoxes of the text is that, until it is read, in a very real 
sense it is not truly a text. It is only coded marks on a surface. It takes on 
meaning when it is read–which means, when it is somehow related to sound 
(internally in the imagination or externally, aloud), and thereby made to
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move through time. For sounded words are not things, but events: a sounded 
word can never be present all at once, as things are. In saying “nevertheless,” 
by the time I get to the latter part of the word, “-theless,” the fi rst part of the 
word, “never-,” has passed out of existence. When a text which has laid unread 
for several hundred or several thousand years is fi rst seen and, often with great 
diffi culty, fi nally read, moved through current time, the discourse of which the 
text was a record is resumed. And on such occasions, the validity of reader-
response theory makes itself felt. Only in the present reader can any meaning 
for the text assert itself. The reader may feel called on to study assiduously 
in order to create, as far as possible, the original world in which the text was 
put down so as to resume the discourse, so far as possible, from the point at 
which it was broken off. But he or she has to do the re-creation of the original 
context, too. Textualized discourse, as has so often been pointed out, is of itself 
context-free, but reading it gives it context, always related dynamically to the 
present even more than to the past.
V
Oral utterance is inevitably discourse, verbal exchange between two or 
more persons, and the text reveals itself to us today as more like oral utterance 
than had often been thought before. The interweaving of texts to which a 
sense of intertextuality and a knowledge of reader-response criticism alerts 
us suggests the well-known interweaving of verbalization in the primary oral 
world, where continuity with what had been said was of far more consequence 
than the discontinuity and isolation which have earlier been attributed to 
textual “creations” or “objects.” Oral habits of thought and expression are 
essentially interweavings with each other, deeply repetitive, built on formulaic 
expression, commonplaces, epithets, responsive to the total context in which 
they come into being, and supported in the formal art of rhetoric by the doctrine 
of imitation, which is repetition of sorts, a kind of interweaving of art and 
nature. Such habits of thought and expression were taken for granted before 
the Romantic Age. Their classic expression is Pope’s statement in “An Essay 
on Criticism” that wit deals with “What oft was thought, but ne’er so well 
expressed.” Intertextuality à outrance.
There is no doubt that writing and print (and now the computer) realize 
potentialities in language which oral speech cannot realize, and thus in certain 
ways bring language to a climax (whether to its fi nal climax is no longer so 
certain since the advent of electronics). But it is paradoxical that concerted 
studies of the Text or Writing or Ecriture, with their associated concerns with 
intertextuality, “traces,” and the like, have served to bring out
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features in textualization which are remarkably like the hallmarks of orality 
itself.
What does this say about the origins of hermeneutics in the study of 
texts as texts, when the texts here in some sense seem to dissolve back into 
orality? One thing it might suggest is that, although the scientifi c study of 
hermeneutics or interpretation begins historically with the study of texts for 
reasons earlier suggested, hermeneutics or interpretation is in fact antecedent 
to textuality. Hermeneutics needs to be considered in perspectives beyond 
those in which it understandably arose as a scientifi c study, just as rhetoric has 
had to be considered as a highly developed human activity long antedating the 
scientifi c study of rhetoric or the “art” of rhetoric.
Most modes of human verbalization have never been written at all and 
never will be. Of the tens of thousands of languages spoken by Homo sapiens 
since the species fi rst appeared, almost none have or have had or ever will 
have any textual existence at all. Most of them have disappeared without ever 
having been written and many more are fast disappearing leaving no literature 
behind. It has been calculated that since the beginning of human history only 
some 106 languages have ever had a literature (Edmonson 1971:322) and of 
the 3000 to 4000 spoken today, only some 78 have a literature (332).
Since oral utterance, too, obviously calls for interpretation—people 
have to explain to one another what they say, at least from time to time—
must this interpretation arise only by analogy with textual interpretation? 
The question cuts deep, for when oral language is thought of in terms of 
interpretation, it would appear that it is always interpretation. This goes farther 
than the statement that there are no facts, only interpretations. For it includes 
oral utterance over and beyond that which may be concerned with “facts.” The 
term “fact” in our ordinary sense of that which is actually the case, appears 
very late in English (in the Oxford English Dictionary the fi rst record of its 
use dates only from 1581). Human utterance is concerned basically with more 
than announcing or disputing “facts,” although it sometimes does deal with 
“facts,” too.
Oral utterance comes into being in a holistic situation which is 
fundamentally nonverbal. Two or more human persons exist in a given temporal, 
spatial, social, interpersonal setting into which words erupt, not as things, but 
as events. For words are sounds, and sounds are events. Words modify the 
holistic situation and in one way or another they explain or interpret it, make 
something known in it that was not know before—a need for assistance, a 
manifestation of unity as in a greeting, or, as in some greetings, a manifestation 
of hostility, a manifestation of the meaning of some nonverbal element in the 
situation, a manifestation of exaltation or celebration, and so on ad infi nitum.
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It is in orality that verbal expression has its origin. The oral word is 
essentially a call, a cry (Ong 1967:111-75). It is not a thing or a reifi cation, 
but an event, an action. The oral word is a call from someone to someone, an 
interpersonal transaction. No interactive persons, no words. The oral word is 
a unique kind of event and it may have to do with all sorts of things, including 
information and even “facts,” but if there is no hint of another person, real or 
imaginary, to whom the word is addressed, called out, cried out, the sound 
is simply not functioning as a word. Because it is a call, a cry, addressed to 
another person or, the equivalent, an imagined person or persons, the oral word 
is essentially explanation or interpretation or hermeneutics, a clarifi cation 
by one person of something that to his or her interlocutor or interlocutors is 
otherwise not evident.
The etymology of the term “interpret” is informative here. It comes 
through the Latin from a Proto-Indo-European root per-, meaning “to traffi c 
in, to sell,” and, more remotely, “to hand over, to distribute.” This root belongs, 
with many other verbal roots, to a more generalized Proto-Indo-European root 
group per-, which forms the base of many prepositions and proverbs with the 
fundamental meaning of “forward” or “through,” a meaning which gets widely 
extended to senses such as “in front of,” “before,” “early,” “toward,” “around,” 
and so on. To this root, the Latin form adds the preposition inter, which itself 
means “between.” The Latin term interpres thus means initially an agent who 
barters between two parties, a broker or negotiator, and from this comes to 
mean an interpreter pretty much in the present sense of this English word, that 
is, an explainer.
It will be noted how far all this is from a sense of language as essentially 
a phonocentric or logocentric enterprise (Culler 1982:92), a set of signs cued 
one-to-one to each other and to external reality outside consciousness. We are 
here in a climate of interpersonal negotiation, in which meaning is brought 
into being and sustained or changed through discourse between persons set in 
a holistic, essentially nonverbal context. Indeed, since the per- root refers to 
interaction and the prefi x inter- to in-betweenness, the term interpres and its 
English derivative “interpreter” reinforce the idea of inbetweenness by a kind 
of doubling of the idea. An interpreter is in between his or her interlocutor 
and the noninterpreted phenomenon–whether something not a human creation 
such as a bank of red clouds at sunset, or something that is a human creation, 
such as a gesture or, paradigmatically, as has been explained earlier, a verbal 
utterance. Ultimately, meaning is not assigned but negotiated, and out of a 
holistic situation in the human life world: the speaker or writer in a given 
situation, which is shared by speaker and hearer in oral communication, but in 
written communication is generally not shared.
Interpretation as an activity that inhabits or suffuses the oral world and 
interpretation as an activity that is applied to texts relate to one another in
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many ways beyond those specifi ed here. All that these refl ections undertake to 
do is to suggest some of the differences in ground between interpretation in a 
purely oral world and textual hermeneutics.
Saint Louis University
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